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ABSTRACT
We analyze the consequences of diet choice behavior for the evolutionary dynamics
of foraging traits by means of a mathematical model. The model is characterized by
the following features: Consumers feed on two different substitutable resources that are
distributed in a fine grained manner. Consumers decide upon encounter with a resource
item whether to attack it or not so as to maximize their energy intake. Simultaneously,
evolution occurs in either of five different traits involved in the foraging process. For
each trait, a trade-off exists between the consumer’s ability to forage on the alternative
resources. The model predicts that flexible diet choice behavior can guide the direction
of evolutionary change and that flexible behavior can mediate coexistence of different
consumer types. Such polymorphisms can evolve from a monomorphic population at
evolutionary branching points and also at points where a small genetic change in a
trait can provoke a sharp instantaneous and non-genetic change in choice behavior.
In the case of weak trade-offs, the evolutionary dynamics of a dimorphic consumer
population can lead to alternative evolutionarily stable communities. The robustness
of these predictions is checked with individual-based simulations and by relaxing the
assumption of optimally foraging consumers.
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Introduction
The fitness of an individual depends on traits that change relatively little during a lifetime
and on behavioral patterns that can change on much faster time scales. Waddington pointed out
that behavioral patterns can direct the evolution of less labile traits by influencing the strength and
direction of selection pressures acting on other aspects of the phenotype (e.g. Waddington 1975;
for reviews see Bateson 1988, Plotkin 1988, Wcislo 1989). This paper focuses on the particular
case where dietary choice behavior interacts with the evolution of genetically determined foraging
traits of a consumer feeding on multiple resources. To illustrate this interaction we might think
of a seed-eating bird species. Selection acts on the bill such that its success in extracting seeds
would be maximized and the handling time to do so would be minimized. The strength and
direction of selection is determined by the behavioral diet choice of the individual: If birds accept
a variety of different seeds, the bill will form a compromise imposed by conflicting needs. A bill
suitable for foraging on small seeds is most likely unsuitable for foraging on large seeds and if both
types are included in the diet, this will result in a generalist bill. If a bird solely chooses small
seeds, selection will favor all morphological adaptations that increase the foraging rate for them,
irrespectively of how detrimental such adaptations are on the birds foraging rate for large seeds.
This example illustrates how diet choice behavior sets the selection pressure for morphological
characteristics. On the other hand, diet choice itself is influenced by the morphological traits of
the bird, because these traits determine the behavior by which an individual can, given some time
constraint, maximize its energy uptake (Stephens and Krebs 1986). An additional complexity arises
when consumers regulate the abundance of their resources. In this case morphological traits and diet
choice behavior affect the abundance of resources while, in turn, resource availability determines
diet choice behavior and thereby influences the selection pressures acting on morphological traits.
The main goal of this paper is to show how behavior can interact with the evolutionary dy-
namics of morphological traits. As a case in point, the evolution of foraging traits of one consumer
species feeding on two different resources is studied. This situation has been analyzed in detail
by Rueﬄer et al. (2006a), in a study that built further on a series of models by Lawlor and May-
nard Smith (1976), Lundberg and Stenseth (1985), Abrams (1986) and Wilson and Turelli (1986).
In all these models it is assumed that consumers behave opportunistically, i.e., they attack any prey
they encounter, regardless of their morphology. Under this assumption the evolutionary dynamics
can be classified with respect to two independent properties: the shape of the trade-off curve and
the possibility for selection to be frequency-dependent (Rueﬄer et al. 2006a). Trade-off shape is the
main determinant of evolution in the frequency-independent case, as introduced by Levins (1962).
The curvature of the trade-off determines whether the generalist trait is an endpoint of evolution,
or whether it is susceptible to invasion by deviating mutants. Frequency-dependence, on the other
hand, determines whether it is possible for different types to coexist in a protected polymorphism
and whether such polymorphisms can emerge at an evolutionary branching point through a series
of mutational steps of small effect (Metz et al. 1996; Geritz et al. 1998). In Rueﬄer et al. (2006a)
we show that the presence or absence of frequency-dependent selection depends on the trait that
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is considered to be evolutionarily variable.
In this paper the constraint of opportunistic consumer behavior is removed and the compo-
sition of a consumer’s diet is derived from optimal diet theory (Stephens and Krebs 1986). The
approach is roughly as follows. The first step is to determine the optimal behavior of residents in
a morphologically monomorphic population. Subsequently, a mutant type is envisaged that differs
in its morphology from the resident population. The behavior of mutant individuals depends on
their own morphology and on the abundance of the resources, as determined by the resident type.
The joint effects of morphology and behavior decide whether the mutant is going to be successful
or will disappear from the population. Given successful invasion of an initially rare mutant several
different configurations occur in practice for the new population dynamical equilibrium. Firstly, the
mutant replaces the former resident and shows the same diet choice as its predecessor. Secondly,
the mutant replaces the former resident and shows a diet choice different from that of its predeces-
sor. Thirdly, the mutant coexists with the former resident in a protected dimorphism where both
types choose the same resources as the former resident; and fourthly, the mutant coexists with
the former resident in a protected dimorphism in which the former resident sticks to its behavior
while the mutant adopts a behavior different from that of the former resident. By following a series
of consecutive mutation events the dynamic interplay between instantaneously optimized behavior
and the evolutionary dynamics of morphological traits can be studied.
In order to distinguish between a consumer’s ability to use different resources and a consumers
choice behavior with respect to different resources, the terminology of Rosenzweig (1981, 1987)
will be adopted here. A consumer that is equally well adapted to utilize a variety of resources
is called a “generalist” while a consumer that is specialized in its abilities on a few resources at
the cost of being poorly adapted on other resources is called a “specialist”. These terms refer to
genetically determined foraging traits, whatever their exact nature, that are assumed to change
on an evolutionary time scale through the invasion of novel mutants. To simplify matters, in the
remainder of this paper we refer to traits of this category as morphological. At the behavioral
end, a consumer attacking all encountered prey is called “opportunist” while a choosy consumer is
called “selector”. These terms refer to diet choice behavior, which is assumed here to be adjusted
instantaneously so as to maximize energy intake. We will refer to traits of this second category as
behavioral.
The structure of the present paper is as follows. First a model of one opportunistic con-
sumer feeding on two discrete resources is introduced, based on Rueﬄer et al. (2006a), which is
subsequently extended towards flexible consumer behavior. The resulting evolutionary dynamics
of the model with flexible diet choice are compared to those obtained in Rueﬄer et al. (2006a)
and checked with individual-based simulations. Finally, the assumption that consumers behave
optimally is dropped by introducing foraging inaccuracy.
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The model
In this section a population dynamical model of one consumer feeding on two resources is
constructed. The resources are assumed to be nutritionally substitutable and homogeneously dis-
tributed in space. This model is identical to the one presented in Rueﬄer et al. (2006a), where
more details of the model description can be found. Based on the population dynamics of the
consumer an expression for invasion fitness is derived that is used to study both the dynamics of
morphological traits and behavior. Table 1 gives an overview of all model parameters.
Population dynamics
The derivation of the population dynamical model is based on a time scale argument (Schoener
1978; Schaffer 1981; Geritz and Kisdi 2004). The consumer population has non-overlapping gen-
erations and reproduces once per year. The population is censused after juvenile mortality and
consumer densities are assumed to stay constant until the next reproductive event. The dynamics
of the resources occur on a much faster time scale and these dynamics are followed in continu-
ous time within a year. Since the consumer density does not change on this time scale, resource
densities reach a within-year equilibrium. First the dynamics of the consumer is introduced as a
function of the, as yet unspecified, equilibrium densities of the resources. In a second step the
resource dynamics and their equilibrium are derived.
The recurrence equation for the consumer is given by
Nt+1 = (α1C1 + α2C2)Nt, (1)
where Ci is the functional response of the consumer for resource i. The constant αi is the conversion
efficiency of consumed resources into offspring. Prey consumption is modeled by applying a two-
species version of Holling’s disk equation, resulting in a saturating (type II) functional response Ci
for each resource i (Case 2000):
Ci =
eiRˆitpifi
1 + e1Rˆ1tp1(tp1 + f1tm1) + e2Rˆ2tp2(tp2 + f2tm2)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. (2)
The number of encountered prey per time step is the product of search efficiency ei and resource
density Rˆit in year t. Upon encounter the consumer decides to attack the prey with probability pi. In
Rueﬄer et al. (2006a) it was assumed that any prey is attacked upon encounter, i.e., p1 = 1 = p2.
In this paper the p-values are derived according to optimal diet choice theory and the detailed
procedure is described in the next section. The capture probability fi represents the probability
that an attacked prey is actually subdued. The handling time consists of two components: the
pursuit time tpi and the manipulation time tmi. The pursuit time is the time that is needed to get
hold of a prey once it is detected. After the prey is caught it might still need a treatment before it
can be consumed, the duration of the treatment is the manipulation time. The denominators of C1
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and C2 are identical and can be factored out. This factor, to be referred to as search probability,
s = 1/
(
1 + e1Rˆ1tp1(tp1 + f1tm1) + e2Rˆ2tp2(tp2 + f2tm2)
)
(3)
is the fraction per time step spent searching for prey. Equation (1) can now be written as
Nt+1 = s
(
α1e1p1Rˆ1tf1 + α2e2p2Rˆ2tf2
)
Nt. (4)
The resource dynamics within the foraging season in year t is followed on a within-year time
scale τ :
dRit
dτ
= bi − diRit(τ)− CiNt for i ∈ {1, 2}. (5)
We assume that resource production is constant with influx bi. The death rate is given by di. Since
constant consumer densities Nt are assumed within years, the following implicit description of the
resource equilibria Rˆit using equation (2) and (3) can be given:
Rˆit =
bi
di + eipifisNt
for i ∈ {1, 2}. (6)
In order to calculate the consumer and resource equilibria, one has to solve equation (4) and (5)
simultaneously using equation (2) and (3). This can be done analytically but yields rather lengthy
expressions that are not shown here (Mathematica notebook available on request).
Diet choice
A crucial parameter in this study is the probability of attack by the consumer upon encounter
with an item of the ith resource, pi. This parameter has no counterpart in the models of Lawlor
and Maynard Smith (1976), Lundberg and Stenseth (1985), Abrams (1986), and Wilson and Turelli
(1986). These authors assume that consumers behave opportunistically. In Rueﬄer et al. (2006a)
both p-values are explicitly set equal to one. In this paper adaptive consumer behavior is allowed:
each individual chooses an optimal diet depending on its morphology and the abundance of the
two resources. If consumers have perfect information and make optimal decisions, this procedure
gives rise to the “zero-one rule”, i.e., an individual either always or never attacks a certain resource
(Stephens and Krebs 1986). How does this rule from the individual level extends to the population
as a whole (Giraldeau and Caraco 2000)? In principle it is conceivable that a morphologically
monomorphic population consists of a mixture of different feeding types, e.g. opportunists and
selectors, at frequencies such that the fitness of all foraging strategies is equal. In appendix A we
show that in the present model such a behavioral polymorphism cannot occur in a morphologically
monomorphic population. At population dynamical equilibrium, either all individuals are selectors
or all individuals are opportunists. In order to distinguish between these different cases, resources
are assigned a profitability (Stephens and Krebs 1986). It is defined as the fitness gain a certain
resource item entails for the consumer per investment of time:
ρi =
αifi
tpi + fitmi
. (7)
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If pursuit time tpi is negligible, profitability simplifies to ρi = αi/tmi. If both the pursuit and the
handling time are negligible, attacking a prey is cost-free resulting in opportunistic consumers. For
each individual consumer it is always beneficial to attack the resource with the higher profitability.
The question is whether it also pays to attack the lower ranked resource as well. In appendix A
it is shown that a population of specialists feeding on the more profitable resource j will include
the less profitable resource i in its diet, when the latter could sustain a consumer population on its
own (see also Vincent et al. (1996)) and that this condition is met when
ρi > 1. (8)
How do consumers behave in a morphologically dimorphic population? This question becomes
important when the emergence of rare mutants is considered. Due to its deviating morphology it
might be beneficial for a mutant to also deviate in its behavior. This possibility will influence both
a mutant’s probability of invasion (see next section) and its scope to coexist with the resident. Here
it is assumed that individuals are able to adjust their behavior instantaneously and that it takes
no learning period to get perfect knowledge on the environmental condition. Whether a mutant
only attacks the resource with the higher profitability or also feeds on the lower ranked resource,
crucially depends on the resource abundances it encounters and therefore on the morphological
traits and the behavior of the resident (appendix A). Once a morphologically dimorphic population
has reached its ecological equilibrium, the behavior of each type is again determined by condition
(8).
Evolutionary dynamics
As in Rueﬄer et al. (2006a), the evolutionary dynamics of five different foraging-related traits
are studied separately (see table 2). Each trait consists of two resource-specific components. For
instance, capture probability can be measured with respect to resource 1 and resource 2, denoted f1
and f2. Often we will write such a pair of traits as a vector: f = (f1, f2). We assume that evolution
proceeds along a trade-off curve that constrains covariation in the two traits (fig. 1). An increase in
one resource-specific component is accompanied by a decrease in the other. The trait combinations
x = (x1, x2), where x ∈ {e,f , tp, tm,α}, on this curve in the (x1, x2)-space are parameterized by a
specialization coefficient θ that varies continuously between 0 and 1. For given resource densities,
specialization for resource i corresponds to an increase in the functional response αiCi, that is, to
an increase in either αi, ei or fi or to a decrease in tmi or tpi (see eq. 1). Therefore we have to use
different parameterizations. If x ∈ {α,e,f}, then x = (x1max(1−θ)
1
z , x2maxθ
1
z ) and if x ∈ {tp, tm},
then x(θ) = (x1max − x1min(1− θ)
1
z , x2max − x2minθ
1
z ), where x1min, x1max, x1min, x2min are positive
constants. These parameterizations are such that θ = 0 corresponds to a specialist for resource 1
while θ = 1 corresponds to a specialist for resource 2. The positive parameter z determines the
curvature of the trade-off curve. The trade-off curve is linear when z = 1. Furthermore, z > 1
corresponds to a weak trade-off, while z < 1 corresponds to a strong trade-off (fig. 1). In comparison
– 7 –
with a linear trade-off curve, generalists with θ = 0.5 have lower (higher) total functional response
in case of a strong (weak) trade-off. Throughout this article both the vector x = (x1, x2) and the
specialization coefficient θ are used to characterize a pair of resource specific traits on a trade-off
curve.
The possibility that a rare mutant invades a resident community depends on its invasion
fitness w, i.e., its long term per capita growth rate in an environment where the resource densities
are determined by the trait values and the behavior of the resident consumers (e.g. Metz et al.
1992). The growth rate of a mutant depends on its foraging morphology and its behavior. It
might therefore be tempting to account explicitly for the effect of both morphology and behavior
in the notation of the fitness function by writing w(θ′,p′, θ,p). However, this notation would be
misleading because it suggests that p is a free parameter that can vary independently of θ. This is
not the case for two reasons. Firstly, from inequality (8) we can conclude that the diet composition
of a resident consumer population is fully determined by its morphology. In other words, at
population dynamical equilibrium of consumers and resources diet choice is an emergent property
of morphology. This implies that also the resource equilibria Rˆi (eq. 6) are fully determined by the
θ-value of the resident consumers. Secondly, from equation (A1) in appendix A follows that the
diet choice of mutants is determined by their morphology and by the resource densities as set by
the resident consumers. Hence, invasion fitness is fully determined by the specialization coefficients
of the mutant and the resident. For x ∈ {e,f , tp, tm} invasion fitness is given by
w(θ′, θ) = α1C1(θ
′, Rˆ1(θ), Rˆ2(θ)) + α2C2(θ
′, Rˆ1(θ), Rˆ2(θ)), (9)
where Ci is given by equation (2) and Rˆi(θ) denotes resource equilibria across years set by a
consumer with trait value θ. For x = α the αi’s are functions of θ
′ instead of the Ci’s.
We assume that mutations are rare and of small effect. Because of the first assumption the
ecological and evolutionary time scales are separated: a population has reached its ecological equi-
librium before a new mutant arises. This approximation is an essential prerequisite for using the
toolbox of adaptive dynamics (Metz et al. 1996; Geritz et al. 1998; Waxman and Gavrilets 2005).
Both assumptions together assure that the evolutionary dynamics of clonal populations consist-
ing of a single phenotype, is equivalent to those of a diploid sexual model with additive genetics
(Van Dooren in press; Metz in press).
Mutants with w(θ′, θ) > 1 can invade while mutants with w(θ′, θ) < 1 certainly go extinct. The
direction of evolutionary change can be derived from the fitness gradient, i.e., the first derivative
of the fitness function (eq. 9) with respect to the mutant’s trait evaluated at the resident’s trait.
Trait values θ∗ where the fitness gradient equals zero, that is,
0 =
∂w(θ′, θ∗)
∂θ′
∣∣∣∣
θ′=θ∗
(10)
are of special interest. These are called evolutionarily singular points by Metz et al. (1996) and
Geritz et al. (1998) and they can be classified according to two independent properties: convergence
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stability and invadability (Geritz et al. 1998; Rueﬄer et al. 2004). The first property determines
whether a singular trait value is approached from nearby (Eshel 1983; Christiansen 1991; Abrams
et al. 1993; Geritz et al. 1998) while the second property determines whether any consumer with
a different trait value can increase in frequency when initially rare in a population dominated
by individuals with θ∗ (Maynard Smith 1982). Singular trait values that are both convergence
stable and uninvadable are final stops of evolution and were named continuously stable strategies
or CSSs by Eshel and Motro (Eshel and Motro 1981; Eshel 1983) while singular points that lack
both properties are evolutionary repellors. A convergence stable and invadable trait value is called
an evolutionary branching point (Metz et al. 1996; Geritz et al. 1998). At these points selection
becomes disruptive and favors increased genetic variation (Rueﬄer et al. 2006b).
Results
From equation (7) we can see that the profitabilities ρi of the resources depend on αi, fi, tpi and
tmi but not on the search efficiencies ei. Profitabilities are independent of search efficiencies because
of the assumption made in optimal foraging theory that encounter without attack takes no time
and entails no extra cost (Stephens and Krebs 1986). Therefore the frequency of encounter has no
influence on the decision to attack a prey. Depending on the values of the other traits, either both
resources or only one of them is attacked. If both resources are attacked, evolutionary dynamics
are identical to those reported in Rueﬄer et al. (2006a), where diet choice is always opportunistic.
If only one resource is attacked, then the consumer population experiences directional selection
towards specialization in search efficiency for the chosen prey, independent of the initial condition
and the curvature of the trade-off.
For the four other traits, behavior does depend on the trait values of the consumer and can
therefore change as traits evolve. For the remainder of this paper we make the assumption that all
non-evolving traits and fixed parameters are symmetric with respect to the two resources. Then
consumers characterized by θ = 0.5 equalize the profitabilities (ρ1 = ρ2) and we refer to them as
generalists. Asymmetric parameter values do not change the results qualitatively but merely make
figures 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 less symmetric. Generalists attack both types of prey upon encounter. The
question is whether consumers to whom one resource is more profitable than the other will include
the less profitable resource in their diet. From equation (7) we see that the two profitabilities are
monotone functions of the trait values and therefore also of the specialization coefficient θ. This
means that with increasing specialization the profitability of one resource continuously increases
while the profitability for the other continuously decreases. The less profitable resource is dropped
from the diet as soon as its profitability decreases below 1 (eq. 8). It follows that consumers
behave as an opportunist in an interval around θ = 0.5, as a selector for resource 1 (p = (1, 0))
for values of θ sufficiently close to 0 and as a selector for resource 2 (p = (0, 1)) for values of θ
sufficiently close to 1. From figure 2 we can see that the region of opportunistic behavior grows
with decreasing strength of the trade-off (with increasing values of z). Because weak trade-offs
– 9 –
correspond to high profitabilities ρi (ei, fi and αi are increasing functions of z, while tpi and tmi are
decreasing functions of z, see figure 1), they make it more likely that the condition for opportunistic
behavior (eq. 8) is met.
Resident consumers switch from opportunistic to selective behavior when inequality (8) turns
into an equality. For such a θ-value the two behavioral alternatives yield exactly the same fitness and
the probability to attack the less suitable resource can take any value between zero and one without
affecting fitness. At these switch points, not only the behavior of residents changes discontinuously
but also that of mutants (fig. 3). Therefore the fitness gradient (eq. 10) is not defined. These
trait values are named “degenerate singular points” here, because they are critical points of the
fitness function but lack differentiability. The model behavior is special at these degenerate singular
points, as described below.
We first discuss the consequences of flexible diet choice behavior for the evolutionary dynamics
of monomorphic populations. In the central region of the trait space where consumers behave
opportunistically the model is identical to our previous model where diet choice was absent (Rueﬄer
et al. 2006a). Hence, the generalist with θ = 0.5 is a CSS for weak trade-offs. In case of strong trade-
offs the generalist is a branching point of the evolutionary dynamics for capture probability f and
an evolutionary repellor for conversion efficiency α, pursuit time tp and manipulation time tm (fig.
2 & 3). In the boundary region of the trait space where consumers behave selectively they do not feel
any trade-off. In this situation selection favors further specialization in all traits and independently
of the curvature of the trade-off (fig. 2 & 3). Hence, any ancestral population of selectively behaving
individuals evolves towards complete morphological specialization and convergence stable singular
points (CSSs and branching points) are not globally attracting anymore but only attract within the
interval where the resident consumer behaves opportunistically. As a consequence, the possibility
that a polymorphism emerges via an evolutionary branching point depends on initial conditions
(fig. 2a & 3b).
We now turn to the evolutionary dynamics of dimorphic populations. A major result of
Rueﬄer et al. (2006a) was that coexistence of different phenotypes is possible when these differ
sufficiently in either search efficiency e or capture probability f while phenotypes that only differ
in conversion efficiency α, pursuit time tp and manipulation time tm cannot coexist. In the first
case coexistence is mediated by negative frequency-dependent interactions. Frequency dependence
is not present in populations dimorphic for α, tp and tm. In appendix B we prove that negative
frequency dependence is present for any trait whenever the morphologies are sufficiently different
such that genotypes differ in their diet choice. Hence, flexible diet choice can mediate coexistence
of different phenotypes that could not coexist in the absence of such behavior.
Whether the behavior of a rare mutant type deviates from that of the resident is indicated in the
PIPs of figure 3 by mutant choice boundaries. These lines are defined by an equality in the switching
conditions (eq. [A1] in appendix A). The two types in a given mutant-resident combination differ in
their behavior when a vertical line drawn from the main diagonal at the resident’s trait value to the
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mutant’s trait value crosses a mutant choice boundary. After the successful invasion of a mutant
two scenarios have to be distinguished. The individuals of a successful mutant population either
stick to their new behavior until the new population dynamical attractor is reached or they switch
behavior again once their population size has passed a certain threshold. Which scenario applies
to a given mutant-resident combination can also be deduced from the mutant choice boundaries.
The first happens when the mutant is sufficiently specialized such that it would behave selectively
if it were the only resident (fig. 3 & 4). The latter happens when the mutant trait lies in the region
of trait space where trait values correspond to a selector when they are rare and to an opportunist
when they are the resident (fig. 3 & 4). In this case a horizontal line drawn from the mutant’s
trait to the main diagonal crosses a mutant choice boundary again.
Once a population is dimorphic, the further co-evolutionary dynamics of the two types can be
read from figure 4. The depicted plots show the sets of pairs of phenotypes that are able to coexist
in a protected dimorphism. These sets are given by the overlapping parts of the ‘+’ region of a
pairwise invadability plot (PIP) and its mirror image taken along the main diagonal (for further
details see Metz et al. (1996); Geritz et al. (1998, 1999)). Note that the plots in figure 4 are
symmetric with respect to the main diagonal. The two symmetric parts show the same dynamics
but with a reversed numbering of the two types. The direction of selection acting on two coexisting
types, indicated by the arrows in figure 4, can be derived graphically with a geometrical method
described in Rueﬄer et al. (2004), but taking into account whether a mutant changes behavior or
not.
Polymorphisms can emerge in two different ways. Firstly, in case of capture probability f
a dimorphism can emerge at an evolutionary branching point (figs. 2 & 3). In the initial phase
after branching the coexisting types remain opportunists (figs. 4a & 5a). In the course of further
divergence both types become genetically more specialized and each type approaches the parameter
region where prey selection pays off. When the rate of evolution differs in the two types, one of
them turns into a selector while the other is still an opportunist. This results in a population with
”nested” behavior where the diet of the selector consists of a subset of the diet of the opportunist.
Both types still experience directional selection towards further specialization and finally the pop-
ulation will reach a continuously stable coalition with two extreme specialists that are selectors for
different resources (fig. 4a). To check whether these results are robust against deviations from the
assumption of strict mutation limitation, we present some individual-based simulations in figure 5
(see appendix C for details). In figure 5a the simulation starts with an opportunistically behaving
monomorphic population characterized by θ = 0.35. Initially evolutionary change occurs in the
direction of the generalist. Then phenotypes on opposite sides of the branching point at θ = 0.5
can establish, giving rise to two diverging lineages. The lineage specializing on resource 2 turns
into a selector slightly earlier than the other lineage specializing on resource 1 does. Once both
types behave selectively, rapid evolution leads to complete specialization.
Secondly, polymorphisms can emerge when a mutant appears that differs sufficiently from the
resident in its morphology and, as a consequence, starts to behave differently. To see this we have
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to compare figures 3 and 4. For most mutant-resident combinations where the mutant is able to
invade and where it differs in its behavior from the resident (fig. 3) the two types are able to coexist
in a protected polymorphism (fig. 4). In case of strong trade-offs this route to polymorphism also
leads to a coalition of two selectors that are each completely specialized on a single resource (fig.
4a,c). With weak trade-offs an alternative evolutionarily stable coalition exists due to the presence
of evolutionary attracting isoclines (fig. 4b,d). Isoclines are found at the zeroes of the dimorphic
fitness gradient (Geritz et al. 1998, 1999):
0 =
∂w(θ′, θ1, θ2)
∂θ′
∣∣∣∣
θ′=θi
. (11)
Superscripts 1 and 2 refer to the two coexisting types of a dimorphic resident community, and
isoclines for changes in resident 1 (i = 1) and resident 2 (i = 2) can exist. However, in our case a
single isocline exists for the opportunists in the region of the phase plane where one type behaves
as an opportunist while the other behaves as a selector (fig. 4b,d). In dimorphic populations
residing on such an isocline the opportunist cannot be invaded by any other type while the se-
lector experiences directional selection just as elsewhere. Whenever the selectors become invaded
by a more specialized type the trait values of the residents no longer reside on the isocline and
opportunists become susceptible to invasion by mutants that improve on the resource neglected by
the selector. Isoclines attach to the boundary of the set of phenotypes that can coexist vertically
above and below and horizontally to the left and to the right of the singular point at θ = 0.5
(fig. 4b,d) (Geritz et al. 1999). If the trade-off is sufficiently weak, the isoclines extend to the
boundary of the trait space (z = 1.5, fig. 4d). This boundary point constitutes an alternative
evolutionarily stable coalition where one type is a specialized selector and the other type behaves
opportunistically and is morphologically intermediate with a bias towards the resource not taken
by the selector. With decreasing values of z the opportunist in the coalition becomes increasingly
specialized on the resource not taken by the selector until it finally pays for the opportunist to
become a selector as well (z = 1.2, fig. 4b). At this point the coevolutionary dynamics enters the
region of the trait space where both types behave selectively, resulting in complete morphological
specialization. In figure 5c we demonstrate this outcome with individual-based simulations. Since
in the case of weak trade-offs a polymorphism cannot emerge via mutations of small effect, the
simulation is initialized by adding 10 immigrants characterized by θ = 0.15 to a resident consumer
population at its ecological equilibrium of 9100 individuals characterized by θ = 0.25.
Although no branching point in the sense of the adaptive dynamics literature (Metz et al. 1996;
Geritz et al. 1998) exists for α, tp and tm, a polymorphism can nevertheless evolve through a series
of mutations of small effect. To see this, consider a scenario with an ancestral type characterized
by a value of θ slightly smaller than 0.5. This phenotype behaves opportunistically and selection
favors mutants with smaller θ-values, i.e., types with a shorter manipulation time for resource 1
(see fig. 2b & 3c). At some point evolution has driven the population so close to the degenerate
singular point that a mutant with a smaller trait value than the resident drops resource 2 from its
diet (fig. 3c). Because resident and mutant differ in their behavior they can coexist despite of their
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small morphological difference (fig. 4c). Now character displacement between the two phenotypes
takes place and the selector becomes completely specialized for resource 1 while the opportunist
evolves in the opposite direction to eventually become a specialist for resource 2. In this scenario
degenerate singular points give rise to dimorphisms through a series of mutations of small effect,
a property that was known previously only from evolutionary branching points. This scenario is
confirmed by individual-based simulations (fig. 5b).
Adding foraging inaccuracy
Empirical tests of optimal diet choice theory revealed that prey choice is better described by
sigmoid functions than by the step functions reflecting the zero-one rule (Krebs et al. 1977). De-
viations from the theoretical predictions of optimal foraging theory can be expected for several
reasons. Consumers are likely to have incomplete information about the abundance of resources
and imprecise estimates about their profitabilities, i.e., about their own performance with respect
to the different resources. Here, we investigate the robustness of our results with respect to devi-
ations from the zero-one rule by assuming that consumers do have perfect information but make
mistakes in their decisions and that the magnitude of these mistakes increases with decreasing
cost of non-optimal behavior, as determined by the fitness difference between opportunistic and
selective behavior. We implement this semi-mechanistic argument by using the following equation
to describe the probability of attack:
pi =
[
1 + exp
(
a
( αjejRˆj(θ)fj
1 + ejRˆj(θ)(tpj + fjtmj)
− ρi
))]−1
. (12)
When pi is plotted as function of the specialization coefficient θ we get a sigmoid curve with
pi = 0.5 at the trait value where an optimally behaving consumer would switch in its diet choice
(fig. 6, first column). The foraging accuracy parameter a determines to what extent diet choice
deviates from the zero-one rule. If a → ∞, perfect decision-making is approached and if a → 0,
prey choice becomes increasingly random. With the introduction of sigmoid prey switch curves the
mutant choice boundaries in figure 3 and the dashed lines in figure 4, which both reflect the abrupt
switch in prey choice of accurately behaving individuals, no longer make sense. The fitness function
becomes differentiable at these points and the kinks in the contour lines of the fitness function get
rounded (fig. 6). When the accuracy parameter a decreases diet choice becomes more and more
balanced and therefore the evolutionary dynamics becomes more and more similar to that found
in the absence of diet choice (Rueﬄer et al. 2006a). In cases with a convergence stable generalist
(CSS or a branching point) the basin of attraction of the generalist grows with decreasing accuracy.
This entails shrinking basins of attraction for the two specialists (fig. 6). In case of a repelling
generalist, that is, for strong trade-offs in combination with evolving manipulation time tm, pursuit
time tp or conversion efficiency α, the situation is more complicated. Two qualitatively different
ways exist in which a degenerate singular point can unfold. Figure 7b shows the first scenario
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in which the degenerate singular points disappear. The generalist strategy becomes immediately
globally repelling, as in the case without prey choice. Figure 7c shows the second scenario in which
a slight inaccuracy changes the degenerate singular points into a CSS and a repellor.
Overall the co-evolutionary dynamics of two coexisting types does not change qualitatively
when foraging inaccuracy is introduced. In all cases the combination of two highly specialized
selectors remains a continuously stable coalition. Also the location of the evolutionary isocline that
occurs in combination with weak trade-offs does not change qualitatively. Hence, the alternative
coalition consisting of one opportunist and one selector remains convergence stable when trade-
offs are sufficiently weak. Only the emergence of polymorphisms by small mutational steps at
degenerate singular points as described in the previous section is hampered. That scenario relied
on the fact that a mutant that only slightly differs in its morphology from the resident can differ
in its behavior from the resident. When foraging inaccuracy causes the degenerate singular point
to disappear altogether (fig. 7b), mutants have to differ more strongly from the resident in order
to enter the area of coexistence compared to the case without foraging inaccuracy (fig. 7c). When
foraging inaccuracy causes the degenerate singular point to give rise to a CSS and a repellor (fig.
7d), a small mutational step can still lead into the area of coexistence (fig. 7e). However, in
this case two new evolutionary isoclines appear that not only prevent further divergence of the
newly established type but even impose convergent selection such that the dimorphic population
eventually collapses to become monomorphic again (fig. 7f). Only mutants that lie beyond these
isoclines can give rise to dimorphisms that undergo disruptive selection.
Discussion
This paper focuses on the consequences of behavioral diet choice for the evolution of various
foraging traits in a consumer facing two different resources. A mathematical model is analyzed that
builds on an existing model for the evolution of morphological characters (Rueﬄer et al. 2006a).
In the original model consumers behave opportunistically and every resource item is attacked upon
encounter. In this study each individual chooses to attack resource items so as to maximize its
energy intake.
The results show that the added feature of behavioral flexibility affects various aspects of the
evolutionary dynamics. (i) Behavior guides the direction of selection. Only resources that are
included in the diet entail a selective force. Consumers that choose few resources will also be-
come specialized in terms of their evolving traits to exploit these resources efficiently. This aspect
has been noted earlier (e.g. Stenseth 1984; Abrams 1986; Brown 1990). (ii) A convergence stable
singular point (CSS or branching point), will only be approached when the ancestral population
behaves opportunistically. Whenever the ancestral population behaves selectively, directional selec-
tion will lead towards specialized morphologies. Therefore diet choice reduces the likelihood that a
population evolves to become a generalist and whether a population can diversify via a branching
point depends on initial conditions. (iii) Successful mutants that differ in their behavior from the
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resident will in most cases not replace the resident but coexist with it in a protected polymorphism.
The emergence of polymorphisms mediated by differential diet choice can occur for a wide range
of parameters through the immigration of phenotypes that deviate sufficiently from the resident or
through mutations of large effect. However, this mechanism can also create polymorphism in the
absence of immigration with mutational steps constrained to be small. This happens whenever a
population evolves towards a degenerate singular point where the less profitable resource becomes
so unattractive that a slightly more specialized mutant turns into a selector. This process, which
generically gives rise to to polymorphisms through a series of mutations of small effect, has to our
knowledge not been described previously. (iv) The incorporation of flexible diet choice enlarges
the set of conditions allowing for coexistence. Whenever two types have mutually exclusive diets,
coexistence is guaranteed. Furthermore, coexistence is possible when the two types have nested
diets, i.e., when one type feeds on both resources while the other selects only one of them. For
conversion efficiency α, pursuit time tp and manipulation time tm diet choice is the sole mechanism
to mediate coexistence. (v) In models lacking diet choice the only continuously stable coalition (i.e.,
attracting and co-evolutionarily stable community) consists of two extreme specialists (Lawlor and
Maynard Smith 1976; Abrams 1986; Rueﬄer et al. 2006a). In the present model two additional
continuously stable coalitions exist given sufficiently weak trade-offs. These consist of one selecting
specialist and one opportunistic intermediate consumer, which is biased in its morphology towards
the resource that is neglected by the specialist.
Some related models have been analyzed previously but with different emphasis. To our knowl-
edge, Stenseth (1984) was the first to combine the evolutionary dynamics of consumer traits with
optimal diet choice theory. Based on qualitative arguments he concluded that abundant resources
that are difficult to handle favor selective specialists while easy to handle and scarce resources select
for opportunistic generalists in case of weak trade-offs and for opportunistic specialists in case of
strong trade-offs. Stenseth’s model does not incorporate explicit resource dynamics and therefore
does not allow for dynamic feedbacks between consumer and resource densities and diet choice
behavior. Brown (1990, 1996) considered a consumer in a patchy environment that can specialize
in terms of its morphology on different patch types and that can choose which patch type to ex-
ploit. He investigates the possible monomorphic and polymorphic evolutionary endpoints that such
a system can adopt. Brown’s model is special in so far as it allows for a mixture of opportunists
and selectors in a morphological monomorphic population, an impossible constellation in the model
analyzed here. At such trait values the population is prone to become morphologically polymor-
phic because selectors and opportunists experience very different selection pressures. Vincent et al.
(1996) investigated the scope for coexistence of different consumer types in a model that yields a
fitness function equivalent to the one analyzed here. Although these authors allow for behavioral
diet choice, they dismiss the possibility that this mechanism mediates coexistence. In the model
version where Vincent et al. consider mixed substitutable resources, they limit their analysis to
the region of the trait space where consumers behave opportunistically. They argue that resources
that are not included in the diet cannot be considered a resource because they cannot sustain a
consumer population on their own. Our results show that this viewpoint excludes a set of inter-
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esting results when populations evolve such that resources become excluded from or included in
the diet over evolutionary time. More recently, Svanba¨ck and Bolnick (2005) analyzed a simple
population genetic model for the evolution of handling time. These authors show that diet choice
can lead to disruptive selection across a wide range of conditions. However, Svanba¨ck and Bolnick
keep consumer dynamics constant and therefore cannot explore the consequences of the feedback
between population dynamics, diet choice, and trait evolution. Abrams and coworkers (Abrams
1999; Abrams and Matsuda 2003, 2004) focus on population dynamical systems of one or more
consumer types feeding on two prey where the population dynamics do not reach a stable equi-
librium. They show that non-instantaneous diet choice or relatively fast evolutionary changes can
cause complex population dynamics and thereby lead to unexpected mean trait values. Abrams
(2006) shows that under these conditions even trimorphisms can readily occur.
Optimal foraging theory predicts that resources with a low profitability are neglected by con-
sumers when resources with a higher profitability are sufficiently abundant (Stephens and Krebs
1986). This prediction is valid at the ecological time scale where resource densities vary in time.
The prediction of optimal foraging theory does not apply when consumer and resource populations
regulate each other such that they reach stable population dynamical equilibria. In this situation
the resource densities are not free parameters but functions of the evolving consumer traits. This
explains why a resource is included in the diet by a resident consumer when the profitability ρi
is greater than unity (eq. 8), a condition that purely depends on consumer traits and not on the
population dynamics of the resource (eq. 7). Therefore, if we account for the feedback between
consumer and resource densities, the statement of Stenseth (1984) that abundant resources favor
selective consumers that subsequently undergo morphological specialization is not relevant. In the
model presented here, the ecological time scale does apply during the process of invasion. An ini-
tially rare mutant type does not affect the resource densities yet. In this phase it can be beneficial
to feed selectively on the more profitable resource. With increasing frequency of the mutant type, it
depletes its preferred resource so that in the end, when it reaches fixation, it may become beneficial
to also forage on the less suitable resource.
Our model is based on the assumption of clonal genetics. In the limit of rare mutations
with small phenotypic effect and random mating, the results apply to monomorphic diploid sexual
populations and polygenic traits. In case of polymorphic sexually reproducing populations, the
course of evolution cannot be predicted straightforwardly from a clonal model. However, some
predictions can still be made. Intermediate heterozygotes will behave as either opportunists or
selectors. Whenever such heterozygotes are inferior, disruptive selection favors any mechanism that
prevents the production of heterozygotes (Rueﬄer et al. 2006b). Processes such as the evolution of
assortative mating or dominance modification lead to two discrete phenotypes and in this situation
we expect that long term evolution will lead to the evolutionary endpoints predicted by the clonal
model. The condition of heterozygote inferiority in a behaviorally polymorphic population is also
given in a model by Svanba¨ck and Bolnick (2005) where it indeed imposes disruptive selection.
The problem of heterozygote inferiority is circumvented altogether when disruptive selection leads
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to a phenotypic dimorphism that does not require a new genetic polymorphism (Rueﬄer et al.
2006b). In, for example, a sexual dimorphism, a polymorphism emerges from a population with
undifferentiated sexes by a mutation in sex-specific genes which are already present. If the two sexes
become sufficiently different in terms of their morphology they will also chose different resources and
subsequently undergo further morphological differentiation (Bolnick and Doebeli 2003; Van Dooren
et al. 2004).
The presented model is based on three different limits. (i) Mutations are rare. This allows for
the separation of ecological and evolutionary time scale. (ii) Foraging accuracy is high. This leads
to the zero-one rule of diet choice. (iii) Learning is fast so that the optimal behavior is adopted
immediately. Of course none of these limits is a proper description of reality. They are primarily
considered because they make the model mathematically tractable. Investigating such limits is
generally informative as a guideline for understanding the phenomena we observe in nature but
it is important to explore how violation of the limiting situation alters the model behavior. We
show that our results are robust against deviations from the first limit by means of individual-
based simulations. In these simulations evolution is not strictly mutation limited and new mutants
frequently arise before previous ones have gone to fixation. These simulations also account for
the effects of drift and of stochastic changes in population size. Deviations from the second limit
are investigated by introducing inaccurately foraging consumers. In this case the step-like prey
switch reflecting the zero-one rule is replaced by a sigmoidal switch and we show that moderate
inaccuracies do not change the qualitative model results. The third limit is the one most difficult to
explore because it corresponds to a change in behavior within an organisms life span. If individuals
need a long learning period before they behave optimally, then the extinction probability of rare
mutants might increase. This would slow down the evolutionary dynamics.
In all scenarios considered here, traits evolved one at a time and not simultaneously as in
natural systems. The simultaneous evolution of several traits might lead to different predictions.
Imagine a scenario where a trait that allows for evolutionary branching, e.g. search efficiency
e, jointly evolves with a trait that does not allow for evolutionary branching, e.g. manipulation
time tm. Assume further that no correlation exists between e and tm and that therefore the
trait space can be parameterized in two independent specialization coefficients, one describing the
degree of specialization in terms of e and one in terms of tm. If both trade-offs are strong, then
selection in e acts in the direction of the generalist’s trait where a population would subsequently
experience disruptive selection, while selection in tm acts towards increasing specialization. Under
these assumptions the phenotype that corresponds to a generalist in both e and tm turns into
a saddle point of the two-dimensional evolutionary dynamics. In this case polymorphisms can
arise in two different ways. If evolution in search efficiency proceeds faster than in manipulation
time, then the population will evolve towards the branching point and become dimorphic in search
efficiency. On the contrary, if evolutionary change occurs faster for manipulation time than for
search efficiency, then the population will evolve towards a degenerate singular point and the
population will become dimorphic in manipulation time as soon as a mutant appears that behaves
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as selector. In either case, whenever the population is dimorphic in one trait, selection favors
a corresponding diversification in the other trait. Eventually the population will consist of two
types, a selector for resource 1 with high search efficiency and a low manipulation time for this
resource and a selector for resource 2 with the corresponding adaptations in search efficiency and
manipulation time. In this example, the evolutionary endpoint does not differ from that predicted
based on the evolution of either trait in isolation. However, the adopted route to this endpoint
appears to be sensitive to initial conditions and to details of the mutational process.
To summarize, this paper shows that behavioral flexibility in diet choice can influence various
aspects of the evolutionary dynamics of morphological consumer traits. Behavior guides natural se-
lection since only resources that are preyed upon contribute to the direction of selection a consumer
experiences. Furthermore, it is shown that diet choice behavior can mediate coexistence of different
consumer types that could not coexist when diet choice is fixed. The effect of flexible diet choice on
the emergence of polymorphism is twofold. On the one hand, flexible diet choice decreases the basin
of attraction of evolutionary branching points. On the other hand, successful mutants that differ in
their diet choice from residents are able to coexist in a protected polymorphism. This mechanism
can even generate polymorphisms through a series of mutations of small effect. The dynamics of
co-evolving consumer populations can lead not only to a community of two selectively behaving
specialists but also to a community of a selective specialist and a more intermediate opportunistic
phenotype.
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Appendix A: Diet Choice
Each consumer individual always attacks the resource with the higher profitability ρi (eq. 7).
Consider the case ρ1 > ρ2. A population of selectors for resource 1 can be invaded by opportunis-
tically behaving individuals with the same morphology if
ρ2 >
α1e1Rˆ1(θ, (1, 0))f1
1 + e1Rˆ1(θ, (1, 0))(tp1 + f1tm1)
, (A1)
where Rˆi(θ, (1, 0)) indicates the equilibrium density of the ith resource as it results from consump-
tion by a monomorphic consumer population with trait-value θ and behavior p = (1, 0) at its
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equilibrium Nˆ . The right-hand side of inequality (A1) per definition equals one because it de-
scribes the the per capita growth rate of a consumer at ecological equilibrium. Hence, condition
(A1) simplifies to ρ2 > 1 (eq. 8). The profitability ρi is the limit of the per capita growth rate of
a selector for resource i for large resource abundance:
lim
Ri→∞
αieiRifi
1 + eiRi(tpi + fitmi)
=
αifi
tpi + fitmi
.
Therefore, inequality (A1) is equivalent to demanding that resource two can sustain a viable popu-
lation on its own given the resource is sufficiently abundant. In case condition (A1) is fulfilled, one
has to check whether opportunists will replace selectors or whether both behaviors can coexist, i.e.,
whether the two behavioral strategies can invade each other. Mutual invadability is given when
next to condition (A1) also the following condition holds:
ρ2 <
α1e1Rˆ1(θ, (1, 1))f1
1 + e1Rˆ1(θ, (1, 1))(tp1 + f1tm1)
. (A2)
For this model we prove that in a morphologically monomorphic population at population dynamical
equilibrium all individuals behave either as selectors or as opportunists, that is, the conditions (A1)
and (A2) cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. This follows from the fact that if ρ1 > ρ2 > 1, then
the density of resource 1 in the presence of an opportunistic consumer population, Rˆ1(θ, (1, 1)), is
lower than in the presence of a population that feeds selectively on resource 1, Rˆ1(θ, (1, 0)), where
in each case it is assumed that the consumer population is at its population dynamical equilibrium
(Mathematica notebook spelling out the algebraic details available on request).
In order to determine the behavior of mutants the same condition (A1) has to be employed.
However, for mutants the right-hand side of this equation is generally not equal to one because
the traits governing the mutant’s functional response do not equal the traits that determine the
abundance of the resources.
Appendix B: Frequency-dependent selection
In this appendix we prove that for our model, selection is frequency dependent whenever a
population is behaviorally polymorphic, that is, when different genotypes show a different diet
composition. In classical population genetics frequency dependence is defined as a dependence of
selection coefficients on allele frequencies. In density-regulated populations a type with a positive
growth rate when rare will have a zero growth rate after fixation, given the population is at
its population dynamical attractor. Hence, under density regulation invasion fitness depends on
frequencies by default and the classical definition of frequency dependence becomes meaningless.
Following Heino et al. (1998) we therefore use the term in a slightly different way that allows to
distinguish cases where the direction of evolutionary change depends on the frequency of different
phenotypes within a density-regulated population.
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We refer the reader to Rueﬄer et al. (2006a) and especially appendix B therein for an in-
troduction to the concept of “feedback environment” and the significance of the dimension of the
feedback vector I. In accordance with Heino et al. (1998) we define selection there as frequency
independent when dimI = 1 and as frequency dependent when dimI > 1. In Rueﬄer et al. (2006a)
we show that if evolutionary change occurs in α, tp and tm while the population is monomorphic
for e and f , then selection is always frequency independent, that is, dimI = 1. On the contrary, if
evolution occurs in e or f , then dimI = 2 and evolution is frequency dependent. Here we restrict
ourselves to show that in behaviorally dimorphic populations necessarily dimI > 1. This means
that through the effect of diet choice selection becomes frequency dependent in cases where it would
be frequency independent in the absence of diet choice.
Assume for the moment, that two different genotypes, θ1 and θ2, are present in the resident pop-
ulation with corresponding manipulation times t1m = (t
1
m1, t
1
m2) and t
2
m = (t
2
m1, t
2
m2), respectively.
These morphological traits result in the genotype specific behavior p1 = (p11, p
1
2) and p
2 = (p21, p
2
2),
search probabilities s1 and s2 and densities Nˆ1 and Nˆ2, respectively. Note that superscripts refer to
the different types while subscripts refer to resource specific traits. The equations for the resource
equilibria (eq. 6) become
Rˆ1(θ
1, θ2) =
b1
d1 + e1f1(p
1
1s
1Nˆ1 + p21s
2Nˆ2)
and Rˆ2(θ
1, θ2) =
b2
d2 + e2f2(p
1
2s
1Nˆ1 + p22s
2Nˆ2)
.
In these equations bi, di, ei and fi are assumed to stay constant over evolutionary time. In order
to track changes in the resource equilibria while the consumer population is evolving the following
two-dimensional I-vector has to be followed: I = (
∑2
j=1 p
j
1s
jNˆ j,
∑2
j=1 p
j
2s
jNˆ j). Note, that when
p1 = p2 this I-vector simplifies to a the scalar I =
∑2
j=1 s
jNˆ j. The identical result holds when
the population is dimorphic in tp or α. In populations dimorphic in f the environmental condition
is given by I = (
∑2
j=1 f
j
1p
j
1s
jNˆ j,
∑2
j=1 f
j
2p
j
2s
jNˆ j). The result for a population dimorphic in e is
analogous.
Appendix C: Individual-based simulations
In this appendix we sketch the algorithm used for the individual-based simulations. Within a
generation, we start by determining the within-year resource equilibria. To this end we use Euler’s
forward method for solving the ordinary differential equations describing the resource dynamics
(eq. 5). In each step we advance the solution through an interval of size h = 2 ∗ 10−3. After
each increment the optimal consumer behavior is determined for each genotype present in the
population. Based on the resource densities and consumer behavior found after 1000 steps in the
Euler algorithm the deterministic number of offspring R0 for each consumer genotype i is calculated
as N it+1/N
i
t (according to eq. 1). The actual offspring number per individual is then determined
by drawing a random number from a poisson distribution with mean R0. Mutations occur with
probability µ = 1 ∗ 10−4 per offspring. Mutant phenotypes are determined by drawing a random
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number from a normal distribution, truncated to [0.01, 0.99], with the mother’s trait value as mean
and standard deviation σ = 0.02. All simulations are initialized with the resident population at its
ecological equilibrium, which ranges from 9000 to 10000 individuals, depending on the trait value.
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Table 1: Notation. The index i refers to one out of two possible resources.
Symbol Definition
αi Conversion efficiency of consumed resource into offspring
bi Constant resource influx
Ci Consumer’s functional response
di Death rate of resource
ei Consumer’s search efficiency [area/time step]
fi Capture probability for an attacked resource item
Nt Consumer population density at time step t
pi Consumer’s probability of attack upon encounter with resource
Ri Density of resources [1/area]
tmi Manipulation time
(needed for treatment of an already capture resource item)
tpi Pursuit time (needed to catch an attacked resource item)
s Search probability (fraction of time spent searching for resources)
θ Specialization coefficient ∈ [0, 1]
(determines location on the trade-off curve)
w Invasion fitness
z Strength of trade-off (z < 1, strong; z = 1, linear; z > 1, weak)
Table 2: Overview of traits considered evolvable. Each parameter stands for a vector of two traits
coupled by trade-off.
Trait Behavioral switch
Conversion efficiency, α yes
Search efficiency, e no
Capture probability, f yes (if tm not negligible)
Manipulation time, tm yes
Pursuit time, tp yes
Fig. 1.— Trade-off in capture probability f (a) and manipulation time tm (b). The number next to
each curve is the parameter z determining the strength of the trade-off. For capture probability a
weak trade-off (z > 1) corresponds to a concave curve while for manipulation time a weak trade-off
corresponds to a convex curve. The trade-off curve is parameterized such that θ = 0 corresponds
to a specialist for resource 1 and θ = 1 corresponds to a specialist for resource 2. Therefore the
two trade-off curves are parameterized in opposite direction. Filled circles half way on the trade-off
curve correspond to the generalist with θ = 0.5. Other parameter values: (a) fmax = (1, 1), (b)
tmmax = (1, 1), tmmin = (0.5, 0.5).
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Fig. 2.— Bifurcation diagram of singular strategies with bifurcation parameter z, the parameter
determining the strength of the trade-off curve. Phenotypes are represented by the specialization
coefficient θ. Arrows give the direction of evolutionary change. Hatched areas indicate parameter
combinations corresponding to non-viable populations. White areas indicate opportunistic foraging
behavior while gray areas indicate selective foraging behavior. Results for capture probability f
(a) and manipulation time tm (b). Results for pursuit time tp and conversion efficiency α are
qualitatively identical to those in (b). The solid vertical black line in (b) indicates that for z = 1
all morphologies corresponding to opportunistic behavior are selectively neutral. Other parameter
values: (a) tm = (0.5, 0.5), fmax = (1, 1), (b) tmmin = (0.5, 0.5), tmmax = (1, 1), f = (1, 1), (a, b)
α = (1, 1), e = (0.05, 0.05), tp = (0.1, 0.1), b = (5000, 5000), d = (0.1, 0.1).
Fig. 3.— Pairwise invadability plots (PIPs) for capture probability f (a, b) and manipulation time
tm (c, d). White areas indicate combinations of mutants and residents where the mutant is able to
invade while gray areas correspond to combinations where the mutant is doomed to extinction. For
each trait one PIP corresponds to a strong trade-off with z = 0.8 (a, c) while the other corresponds
to a weak trade-off with z = 1.2 (b, d). Diet choice of residents, p = (p1, p2), is indicated at the
underbraces at the x-axes. Black solid lines are mutant choice boundaries that indicate changes in
the diet choice of mutants, p′ = (p′1, p
′
2). Other parameter values as in figure 2.
Fig. 4.— Evolution in dimorphic populations for capture probability f (a, b) and manipulation time
tm (c, d) for strong trade-offs with z = 0.8 (a, c) and weak trade-offs with z = 1, 2 (b) and z = 1.5
(d). Each axis gives the value of the specialization coefficient θ of one consumer type. White areas
correspond to phenotype combinations that can coexist in a protected dimorphism. Diet choice at
dimorphic population dynamical equilibrium for each type is indicated by the underbraces at each
axis. Arrows indicate the direction of selection and dots indicate evolutionary stable endpoints.
Thick lines correspond to stable isoclines while dashed lines correspond to a change in the diet
composition of one of the two types. Other parameter values as in figure 2 except forα = (0.92, 0.92)
in (d).
Fig. 5.— Individual-based simulations of trait distributions for capture probability f (a) and
manipulation time tm (b, c). Different tones of gray indicate behavior: black corresponds to
selectors for resource 1, dark gray to opportunists and light gray to selectors for resource 2. The
populations in (a) and (b) are initially monomorphic characterized by (a) θ = 0.35 and (b) θ = 0.45.
The population in (c) consists of monomorphic population characterized by θ = 0.25 to which 10
immigrants, characterized by θ = 0.15, are added. Parameter values as in figure 4. See appendix
C for further details.
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Fig. 6.— PIPs for capture probability f for different values of the accuracy parameter a (in
columns) and different curvatures for the trade-off, as determined by z (in rows). Figures in the
first column show the probability of attack of a resident consumer upon encounter with an item of
resource 1 (p1, on the y-axis) as a function of the specialization coefficient θ of the resident (x-axis)
for a = 3, a = 10 and a = ∞ (darker curves correspond to higher values of a). Curves for p2 are
given by the mirror image of each curve around θ = 0.5. Switch curves in the first figure in a row
and PIPs in the same row that are generated with the same value of a-value are shown in same
shade of gray. Note that the sharp drop-off in p1 occurs for higher values of θ with higher values
of z. Other parameter values as in figure 2.
Fig. 7.— Effect of foraging inaccuracy on the evolution of manipulation time tm in monomorphic
(a,b,d) and dimorphic populations (c,e,f). Figure (a) shows an example of a PIP without foraging
inaccuracy (a = ∞). This PIP can be generated from two different parameter combinations: (i)
z = 0.56, tp = (0.05, 0.05) and (ii) z = 0.8, tp = (0.1, 0.1). Figure (b) and (d) illustrate the the
effect of foraging inaccuracy (a = 50) for each of these parameter combinations. For the first set
of parameters the degenerate singular points disappear altogether (fig. b). As a consequence two
very similar resident types (close to the main diagonal) can never coexist (fig. c). For the second
set of parameters the degenerate singular points unfold into an evolutionary repellor and a CSS
(fig d). In this case coexistence of two types close to the main diagonal becomes possible (fig. e).
However, evolutionary isoclines appear showing that similar resident types experience convergent
selection such that a dimorphic population collapses to become monomorphic again (fig. e & f).
Other parameter values as in figure 2.
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